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Abstract. Intergovernmental grants have been conventionally explained on the basis of either equity/efficiency and/or 
institutional considerations. This paper seeks to model Australian intergovernmental grants by including both 
traditional public finance variables and public choice influences; that is, grants are used by federal government 
politicians to purchase political capital, thereby enhancing their own chances of reelection. The models employed in 
this paper are tested for six Australian states for the period 1981-82 to 1991-92 using unsystematic grant transfers. The 
results provide support for these public choice considerations, and highlight the importance of incorporating 
institutional factors and controlling for misspecification in the error structure in estimates of this type. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The theory of intergovernmental grants now has a well-established literature (Oates, 1972; 
Gramlich, 1977) and the empirical application of this body of thought proceeds apace (Oates, 1979; 
Winer, 1983; Grossman, 1994). Whilst interest has largely focussed on the impact of grants on 
recipient government expenditures and the theoretical justification for grants on social welfare 
grounds, until recently the literature has tended to ignore "...the realities of the political marketplace 
in which governments must operate" (Grossman, 1987: 1). Accordingly, the present paper attempts 
to apply a public choice model to the empirical analysis of intergovernmental grant determination 
in the Australian federal system over the period 1981-82 to 1991-92. 
It is possible to identify two broad approaches to the economic issues raised by 
intergovernmental grants. Firstly, an essentially empirical literature has developed with two largely 
independent strands. Beginning with Wright (1974) economic historians have examined the 
specific question of how grants were allocated amongst American states during the New Deal. This 
line of research focussed the relative importance of political factors compared to traditional public 
finance "equity/efficiency" explanations for grant determination. A separate empirical investigation 
has been directed at estimating the impact of grants on local government fiscal policies, including 
the flypaper effect. The second approach to intergovernmental grants is primarily theoretical and 
derives from Oates' (1972) pioneering work on fiscal federalism and more recent public choice 
work.1 This literature now recognises that any public choice versus public finance dichotomy is 
false since the allocation of grants among lower order political units must perforce be affected by 
both "equity/efficiency" factors and political factors.2 Indeed, only by means of a priori theoretical 
restrictions can a model be limited to only public finance or public choice type variables. The 
present paper falls squarely into this second approach to intergovernmental grants. 
The paper itself is divided into four main parts. Section 2 outlines the institutional peculiarities 
of the Australian federal grants system and the difficulties posed by the principle of fiscal 
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equalisation for the empirical testing of public choice theories. Three models and their associated 
hypotheses for the analysis of intergovernmental grants in Australia for the period 1981-82 to 1991-
92 are discussed in section 3, whilst the results are examined in section 4. The paper ends with 
some brief concluding remarks in section 5. 
2. The Australian federal grants system 
All federal systems are to some extent characterised by the presence of fiscal imbalances. These 
fiscal imbalances, whether vertical - that different levels of government have differing capacities to 
raise revenues to match spending - or horizontal - that a federation's constituent states likewise have 
diverse capacities and costs in the provision of public services - tend to dominate the choice of a 
grants structure (CGC, 1993 Vol. 1: 5).3 Despite this, and with due regard for institutional 
constraints, numerous international solutions have arisen to address the issue of fiscal imbalance, 
whether by means of tax-sharing and/or fiscal equalisation (Mathews, 1982: 3). In general, whilst 
most federal countries, such as Germany and Canada, have availed themselves of highly developed 
informal or formal tax-sharing systems (Mathews, 1982: 3), Australia has "...chosen to pursue a 
policy of horizontal fiscal equalisation...during the course of the transfer of funds from the 
Commonwealth to the states (Thomson, 1986: 172). Given that "...in the case of fiscal 
equalisation...Australia has developed the most sophisticated arrangements of any federal country" 
(Mathews, 1982: 3), some mention should be made of this unusual approach to the issue of fiscal 
imbalance. 
The basic principle of fiscal equalisation in Australia is that "...each State should be given the 
capacity to provide the same standard of State-type public services as the other States, if it makes 
the same effort to raise revenues from its own sources and conducts its affairs with an average level 
of operational efficiency" (CGC, 1993 Vol. 1: 6). Put differently, it is the role of fiscal equalisation 
to standardise a state's public good capacity, with due regard to expenditure needs and revenue 
sources (and the state's own efforts to help itself).4 In practice, fiscal equalisation "...usually takes 
the form of vertical grants from the federal government to the states, but [it] may also consist of 
horizontal grants from states with high fiscal capacity to states with low fiscal capacity" (Mathews, 
1994: 5).5 
In examining the process of fiscal equalisation in Australia, we can identify several key stages. 
Firstly, in light of the "chronic and acute vertical imbalance[s]" (Mathews, 1994: 6) that exist, all 
Australian states have required federal grants (known as general revenue or financial assistance 
grants) to fund their deficits. In order to cover these state deficits, and not reward excessively 
parsimonious or prolifigate state governments, state revenues and expenditures (and accordingly 
state deficits) are standardised in line with the principles of fiscal equalisation. Standardisation 
procedures seek to eliminate the "effects of policy or efficiency differences among the States" 
(Mathews, 1994: 5). Secondly, applying the process of standardisation depends on the 
measurement of fiscal disabilities (CGC, 1993 Vol. 1: 7). These fiscal disabilities, whether revenue 
or expenditure (known as needs), are defined as the differentials that exist between the Australian 
average standard of public good capacity, and the standardised revenues and expenditures of a 
given state.6 For example, expenditure needs are the differential costs, relative to standard, that a 
state needs to provide a standard level of services, whilst revenue needs are the differential 
revenues a state would raise if the standardised revenue effort was applied to its revenue base 
(Mathews, 1994: 5).7 Some characteristics of the disabilities (or disadvantages or advantages in the 
provision of public services) taken into account are input costs, administrative scale, urbanisation, 
physical environment, socio-economic composition and other demographics (CGC, 1993 Vol. 1: 
Sect. 3).8 Finally, and most importantly, "...the assessment of State expenditure and revenue needs 
and hence of general revenue grants relativities is undertaken by the independent  Commonwealth 
Grants Commission" (Mathews, 1994: 7) (emphasis added). Accordingly, it has been argued that 
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the whole process of evaluating disabilities and determining relative grant sizes in Australia takes 
place in "[an] open, flexible and accountable system...free from political and bureaucratic bias" 
(Mathews, 1994: 16).9 
From the above discussion it would seem that little prima facie  evidence exists in Australia for 
the potentially fruitful analysis of political factors in grant determination. Moreover, it would seem 
that the principle of fiscal equalisation, and the existence of an independent statutory authority in 
the form of the Commonwealth Grants Commission (CGC), has produced a system almost wholly 
based upon "equity/efficiency" (Oates, 1972; Gramlich, 1977; Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon, 
1991). Moreover Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon (1991: 663) have observed that "...by and large, 
general purpose grants have been arrived at through the application of formulae, and institutional 
arrangements that have kept political factors at least at arm's length remove from the process". 
Similarly, "the capacity for political factors, particularly those stressed in the public choice 
approach to intergovernmental grants, to determine the size and direction of general purpose grants 
[in Australia] is somewhat attenuated" (Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon, 1991: 663).10 However, 
whilst the opportunity to examine political factors with regard to general revenue, or financial 
assistance grants (FAGs), appears limited, there is nonetheless considerable scope to investigate 
specific purpose payments (SPPs) from a public choice perspective. These transfers from the 
Commonwealth to the states, whilst acknowledged by the CGC, are generally made outside the 
scope of fiscal equalisation and thus are subject to political manipulation. Indeed, the CGC itself 
admits that "SPPs are distributed on all sorts of criteria - but very few on equalisation as the 
Commission understands it" (CGC, 1993 Vol. 1: 16).11 Furthermore, the Commission has also 
advocated "...that any trade-offs between fiscal equalisation and other policy objectives should be 
open and transparent" - indicative of possible conflicts in its position of statutory independence 
(CGC, 1993 Vol. 1: 16). It would seem that such grants distributed to any state "on such terms and 
conditions as the Commonwealth sees fit permits a far more likely avenue for intergovernmental 
political bargaining and trading" (Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon, 1991: 663). 
3. Models and hypotheses 
In broad terms, research methodology usually employed in estimating the impact of political factors 
at the level of the state involves regressing sets of equity/efficiency and public choice variables 
against grants, where significant coefficients on the latter may indicate prima facie  evidence of 
political activity.12 An alternative procedure was pursued by Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon 
(1991) where the equity/efficiency and public choice models form non-nested hypotheses (models), 
even though we have seen that strong theoretical reasons exist for believing that both 
equity/efficiency and public choice variables belong in the same regression.13 Both procedures are 
followed below. 
Table 1 outlines the models and variables used in the pooled time-series, cross-sectional analysis 
of six Australian states in the period 1981-82 to 1991-92.14 A pooled data set is employed given the 
lack of sufficient cross-sectional observations and the requirement to monitor the longitudinal 
behaviour of grant parameters.15 An analogous approach using pooled data has been pursued by 
Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon (1991). The time period 1981-82 to 1991-92 is intended to 
eliminate the long-run structural modifications in the Commonwealth-state grants nexus. The 
framework initially employed for the pooled analysis used the covariance or individual dummy 
variable approach.16 Anticipating the results of diagnostic tests in section 4, the Kmenta (1986) 
technique of pooling time-series and cross-sectional data is also applied.17 In direct reference to the 
latter, there are strong a priori theoretical reasonings to presume that autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity may be a problem is estimations of this type. In the first instance, individual 
grant programs are likely to persist over a number of years, as are the positive political and 
"equity/efficiency" factors that impact upon such programs. In the second instance, it is equally 
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likely that the application of a specific grant across a number of states of varying size infers 
heteroskedastic errors (Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon, 1991). Together, the influence of spatial 
autocorrelation, the prolonged influence of political shocks, and possible data manipulation 
amongst others, ensures a compelling case for controlling for misspecification in the error structure. 
The dependent variables in these specifications are (1) real per capita education special purpose 
payments SPPs (RES), (2) real per capita health SPPs (RHS), and (3) real per capita social security 
and welfare SPPs (RWS). As noted above these categorical grants are listed separately from the 
general revenue, or financial assistance grants (FAGs), and usually carry with them "reasonably 
complicated conditions" (Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon, 1991: 663). Accordingly, "...the scope 
for political intervention in the process of determining the size and conditions under which such 
grants are made seems far greater than is the case for general purpose grants" (Bungey, Grossman 
and Kenyon, 1991: 664).18 
The equity/efficiency model of grant determination is covered by proxy ratios for the objective 
of fiscal equalisation. These independent variables are (1) the education expenditure disability ratio 
(EED), the health expenditure disability ratio (HED), and the social security and welfare 
expenditure disability ratio (WED).19 All three measures are intended to account for the objective 
measurement of disabilities in the provision of state public services. The advantage of these proxies 
is that rather than using the ad hoc  application of presumed disability factors, such as per capita 
income, unemployment levels, and educational level, amongst others (Bungey, Grossman and 
Kenyon, 1991; Grossman, 1994), the ratios directly account for the mechanical and objective 
application of formulae under the principal of fiscal equalisation.20 These ratios are expected to be 
positively related to the level of SPPs in each category, indicating the requirement for grant 
provision on equity/efficiency criteria. The variation in intercepts (STAT) provided under the 
dummy variable pooling technique are also included to account for any unmeasurable 
equity/efficiency variables  for the cross-sectional units (NSW, VIC, QLD, WA, SA, TAS). 
Seven political variables are included in the model to reflect the public choice approach to grant 
determination. These are intended to account for the purchase of political capital from state 
political agents in order to influence the voting decisions of state residents (Grossman, 1994: 296). 
However, given that the "...ability of recipient government politicians to deliver votes and the value 
of this to the grantor government politician...cannot be measured directly" there is the requirement 
that some proxy be employed to account for the distribution and value of political capital in a 
federation (Grossman, 1987: 14). A measure widely employed (Grossman, 1987; 1994; Bungey, 
Grossman and Kenyon, 1981), and also adopted in this study, is that political party affiliation 
adequately proxies such concerns. All other things being equal, "...grants go to those states with 
political agents with the most - and most valuable - political capital to sell", as indicated by party 
similarity (Grossman, 1994: 297).  
Firstly, the number of total federal seats in each state (SEAT) are included (Wright, 1974; 
Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon, 1991; Grossman, 1994). This measure, which merely corresponds 
to the voting population in each state, is incorporated to indicate the ability of federal politicians to 
purchase political capital in small and large states.21 In a sense, two competing forces are at work; 
all other things being equal, a state with a larger population has more significant political capital 
available (in terms of seat numbers), but in a smaller state "...the political benefits from a marginal 
dollar of increased grants are greater since the benefits are concentrated on a smaller number of 
beneficiaries (the per capita impact is greater)" (Grossman, 1994: 298). As a result, the variable 
SEAT may exhibit a positive or a negative sign, depending on which effect predominates. 
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Table 1. Models and variables for grant determination 
Secondly, the proportion of federal seats held by the Commonwealth government in each state 
(SHP) is included (Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon, 1991; Grossman, 1994). The rationale for this 
is straightforward: "In states where the federal government is strong the need to buy votes is low. 
However, in states where the federal government is not well represented, the purchase of political 
Method 
Pooled time-series, cross-sectional analysis of six Australian states for the period 1981/82 - 1991/92. 
Models 
(i) Non-nested Cox and J-tests  
        H0: RES/RHS/RWSjt = β0STAT + β1EED/HED/WEDjt + ujt 
 H1: RES/RHS/RWSjt = β0STAT + β1SEATjt + β2SHPjt + β3SAMEjt + β4ELSjt + β5ELFjt + β6MARPjt + β7PREFPjt + vjt 
(ii) Full regression  
RES/RHS/RWSjt = β0STAT + β1EED/HED/WEDjt + β2SEATjt + β3SHPjt + β4SAMEjt+ β5ELSjt + β6ELFjt +  
β7MARPjt + β8PREFPjt + ujt  
Variables Details Data Sources(s) Sign 
 
RES RHS 
RWS 
 
Real Education, Health 
and Social Security and 
Welfare Special Purpose 
Payments per capita in 
the j-th state in the t-th 
period 
 
Commonwealth grants commission report on general revenue 
grant relativities (Tax-sharing relativities), 1981-1992, AGPS, 
Canberra. Australia: Year books 1981 - 1992, ABS Catalogue 
No. 1301.0 
 
STAT  Cross-sectional dummy 
variable for each state.  
New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (VIC), Queensland (QLD), 
Western Australia (WA), South Australia (SA), Tasmania 
(TAS). 
+ or - 
 
EED HED 
WED 
Education , Health and 
Social Security and 
Welfare expenditure 
disability ratios for the j-
th state in the t-th period. 
Commonwealth grants commission report on general revenue 
grant relativities (Tax-sharing relativities), 1981-1992, AGPS, 
Canberra. 
 
+ 
SEAT Number of federal seats 
in the j-th state in the t-th 
period. 
Parliamentary handbook of the commonwealth of Australia, 
AGPS, 1981-1992. Macintyre, C. (1991) Political Australia: A 
handbook of facts. 
 
+ or - 
SHP Proportion of seats in j-th 
state held by federal 
government in the t-th 
period. 
Parliamentary handbook of the commonwealth of Australia, 
AGPS, 1981-1992. Macintyre, C. (1991) Political Australia: A 
Handbook of Facts. 
 
- 
SAME Dummy if state and 
federal government of 
same party. 
Parliamentary handbook of the commonwealth of Australia, 
AGPS, 1981-1992. Macintyre, C. (1991) Political Australia: A 
handbook of facts. 
 
+ 
ELS Dummy for state election 
held. 
Parliamentary handbook of the commonwealth of Australia, 
AGPS, 1981-1992. Macintyre, C. (1991) Political Australia: A 
handbook of facts. 
 
+ 
ELF Dummy for federal 
election held. 
Parliamentary handbook of the commonwealth of Australia, 
AGPS, 1981-1992. Macintyre, C. (1991) Political Australia: A 
handbook of facts. 
 
- 
MARP Proportion of marginal 
federal seats in j-th state 
in the t-th period. 
Parliamentary handbook of the commonwealth of Australia, 
AGPS, 1981-1992. Macintyre, C. (1991) Political Australia: A 
handbook of facts. 
 
+ 
PREFP Proportion of federal 
seats decided on 
preferences in j-th state in 
the t-th period. 
 
Parliamentary handbook of the commonwealth of Australia, 
AGPS, 1981-1992. Macintyre, C. (1991) Political Australia: A 
handbook of facts. 
 
 
- 
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support is paramount" (Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon, 1991: 662). This accords with Grossman's 
(1994: 297) view "...that a state politician's or state political party's ability to deliver votes is greater 
the greater is that individual's or party's popularity". As a measure of political power, the variable 
SHP should exhibit a negative coefficient in relation to grants. 
Thirdly, SAME, a qualitative (dummy) variable if the state and federal governments are of the 
same political party, is also included. Both Leyden (1992) and Grossman (1994: 297) agree that the 
"...ability to deliver votes is of greater value to the federal politician if all are of the same party". 
This is especially the case in Australia, where "local party machines...and state governments [have] 
a strong influence if not total formal control over seat endorsements, position on party voting 
tickets...[and] can be expected to provide staunch support, and a springboard for effective federal 
campaigning" (Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon, 1991: 662). Moreover, "party differences between 
state and federal politicians...would serve to reduce the likelihood or value to the federal politician 
of the state politician's endorsement and support, and therefore reduce the magnitude of grants 
(Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon, 1991: 662). As a result, SAME will ex ante  exhibit a positive 
sign, indicating an increase in per capita grants for years when the state and federal governments 
are of the same party. 
Fourthly, two qualitative (dummy) variables for elections, state (ELS) and federal (ELF), are 
included in order to account for time-periods when the ability to purchase political capital may vary 
from the norm. Ceteris paribus, we would expect that resources (grants) diverted to state politicians 
in a state election year would be more productive, given the heightened awareness of policies, 
funds available for campaigning and pressing time-horizons. It may also be that relative bargaining 
strengths are altered in favour of state or federal politicians during election years, contingent on 
measures such as federal strength in that state (SHP). However, in the case of federal elections, the 
returns from purchasing political capital in this manner may be off-set by direct political benefits to 
federal politicians from substituting federal direct expenditure for the indirect political benefits of 
grants. In line with the "efficiency of capital" and "return on direct expenditure" type-arguments, 
state election years (ELS) should ex ante  exhibit a positive coefficient with grants and federal 
election years (ELF) should display a negative coefficient. 
Finally, in addition to "absolute" political power indicators such as SHP, two measures of 
"political safety" (Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon, 1991: 662) are included.22 These are, MARP, 
the proportion of federal seats in the state held with a less than five percent two-party preferred 
margin, and PREFP, the proportion of federal seats in a state decided on preferences (Bungey, 
Grossman and Kenyon, 1991). It is anticipated that ceteris paribus a state with more "closely 
fought seats" should receive a larger per capita distribution of grants, and we would expect a 
positive coefficient on MARP. However, it may also be that deals brokered with smaller parties and 
independents, on whom the two main parties may depend, may not be adequately specified in the 
Commonwealth-state grants nexus.23 Accordingly, the more federal seats which rely on 
preferences, the more likely political capital will be purchased by alternatives to grant patronage: it 
follows that a negative ex ante  coefficient with respect to grants is indicated.  
4. Results 
The three models detailed in Table 1 were composed of per capita special purpose education grants 
(Models 1A and 1B below), per capita special purpose health grants (Models 2A and 2B below) 
and per capita special purpose social security and welfare grants (Models 3A and 3B below). 
Models 1A, 2A and 3A follow the covariance or dummy variable pooling technique discussed 
above, whilst models 1B, 2B and 3B follow the procedures outlined by Kmenta (1986: Sect. 12.2).  
  
7
Model 1A in Table 2 presents the results of a regression of various public choice and 
equity/efficiency variables against per capita special purpose education grants (RES). A joint test 
for the inclusion of variable cross-sectional intercepts rejects the null hypothesis of coefficient 
equality. The coefficient for the equity/efficiency variable (EED) is significant and conforms to the 
expected sign on the coefficient. In terms of the public choice variables, the coefficients for SHP, 
SAME, ELS, ELF, MARP and PREFP conform to the expected sign on the coefficient, though only 
PREFP is significant. The coefficient for SEAT is insignificant, although it does correspond to the 
sign expected under the hypothesis that "...political benefits from...a small state are greater than a 
large state" (Grossman, 1994: 298). In general, the results indicate tantalising support in respect of 
expected signs on coefficients, but with low levels of significance (Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon, 
1991). 
In terms of the econometric suitability of the competing equity/efficiency and public choice 
models, the non-nested Cox test rejects both the equity/efficiency model and the public choice 
model (Doran, 1991). A J-test (Davidson and MacKinnon, 1981) however, rejects both singular 
models in favour of the augmented form, encompassing equity/efficiency and public choice 
approaches (see also Kennedy, 1992). When examining the combined model as in 1A, tests for 
autocorrelation using the Durbin-Watson test (DW) and Lagrange multiplier test (LM) both reject 
the null hypothesis of no positive autocorrelation, whilst a Box-Pierce test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis. Various tests for heteroskedasticity all reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. 
Additionally, a test employed to detect functional misspecification fails to reject the null hypothesis 
of no misspecification. Accordingly, Model 1A is reestimated using the technique developed by 
Kmenta (1986) to correct for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation following Bungey, Grossman 
and Kenyon (1991: 663). Model 2A details the results of this approach. The signs on all 
coefficients are identical to those found prior, with the levels of significance improving on the 
equity/efficiency variable STAT and the public choice variables of SHP, SAME and ELF. Tests of 
joint significance for the equity/efficiency variables, and then the public choice variables, reject the 
null hypotheses of joint insignificance in  both instances. An LM test for normality of the 
regression's residuals fails to reject the null hypothesis of normal residuals. In general, the results 
offer tentative support for a public choice model of grant determination, at least in regards to 
education, as against that of Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon "...where the public choice model 
added nothing to the efficiency, equalisation model" (1991: 666). 
Model 2A illustrates the results of a regression with independent public choice variables 
identical to that presented in Model 1, though with the dependent variable now per capita health 
grants (RHS), and the equity/efficiency model represented by the health expenditure disability ratio 
(HED). All coefficients on the public choice variables are identical to the education model except 
MARP and PREFP. In the case of the public choice variables, SEAT and SHP are significant and 
conform to the hypothesised sign; SAME, ELS and ELF are insignificant, though they do conform 
to the hypothesised sign; whilst MARP (significant) and PREFP (insignificant) do not conform to a 
priori expectations. The non-nested Cox test rejects both models, whilst the J-test rejects only the 
equity/efficiency augmented model. Mixed results are obtained on the tests for heteroskedasticity, 
autocorrelation and functionally misspecification. The alternate Kmenta (1986) technique detailed 
in Model 2B, improves the level of significance for ELF and the STAT intercepts. Tests for joint 
significance reject the null hypothesis of joint insignificance for both the equity/efficiency and 
public choice variables. 
 
Table 2. Results of regression estimation for combined models 
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Notes. Values in parentheses are the corresponding standard errors. Asterisk(s) represent the level of significance; * - 10 percent, * - 
5 percent and *** - 1 percent. The ordinary R2 is the preferred measure of goodness of fit for the dummy variable models, 
whilst the BUSE measure is appropriate for the Kmenta (1986) technique. 
 Finally, Model 3A represents variable sets identical to Models 1 and 2, except that the 
dependent variable is now real per capita social security and welfare grants (RWS), and the 
equity/efficiency model is represented by the social security and welfare expenditure disability 
ratio (WED). Unlike the models for education and health, the proxy for expenditure disability 
(WED) is insignificant, although it does conform to the expected sign. It seems probable that 
considerations of welfare are more likely evaluated at the national level rather than that of the state. 
In terms of the public choice variables, SEAT is significant and conforms to the hypothesis that 
political support is more profitably sought in larger states, at least via welfare grants. The variables 
SHP, MARP and PREFP are significant and conform to the hypothesised sign, ELS is insignificant 
and does not accord with a priori  expectations, and SAME and ELF do conform but are 
insignificant. In terms of econometric suitability, the non-nested Cox test rejects both models of 
grant determination, whilst the J-test rejects the equity/efficiency augmented model. Once again, 
autocorrelation and functional misspecification is indicated, though tests for heteroskedasticity fail 
to reject the null hypothesis of homoskedasticity. The alternative estimation technique (Model 3A) 
only slightly modifies the results found before. 
Variable Model 1 - Education Model 2 - Health Model 3 - Welfare 
 A B A B A B 
NSW  111.41** 
(47.102) 
81.673*** 
(31.342) 
422.02*** 
(83.799) 
421.66*** 
(75.970) 
-80.155*** 
(20.350) 
-65.340*** 
(16.276) 
VIC  106.50*** 
(36.943) 
85.479*** 
(26.265) 
341.77*** 
(70.503) 
345.61*** 
(64.688) 
-64.670*** 
(16.126) 
-54.220*** 
(13.418) 
QLD  97.118*** 
(25.743) 
86.231*** 
(16.953) 
245.14*** 
(55.497) 
249.72*** 
(51.769) 
-40.464*** 
(10.916) 
-34.844*** 
(9.777) 
WA  58.946*** 
(20.511) 
57.283*** 
(13.412) 
117.90* 
(60.060) 
134.68** 
(56.939) 
-16.151 
(9.993) 
-12.418 
(10.031) 
SA  57.397* 
(19.006) 
56.791*** 
(13.349) 
94.456 
(58.941) 
108.68** 
(55.117) 
-16.403 
(10.325) 
-11.299 
(10.618) 
TAS 34.930*** 
(19.771) 
37.461*** 
(12.189) 
115.35** 
(56.742) 
130.48** 
(53.702) 
-26.571** 
(8.821) 
-24.271*** 
(9.056) 
EED 35.880*** 
(11.922) 
28.031*** 
(8.511) 
    
HED   129.87** 
(57.109) 
117.73** 
(52.526) 
  
WED     8.917 
(8.199) 
2.597 
(8.621) 
SEAT -1.461 
(0.910) 
-0.691 
(0.616) 
-8.5359*** 
(1.612) 
-8.213*** 
(1.412) 
1.461*** 
(0.380) 
1.183*** 
(0.283) 
SHP -11.952 
(14.142) 
-12.670* 
(7.566) 
-97.667*** 
(29.268) 
-102.18*** 
(22.565) 
12.002* 
(6.461) 
18.640*** 
(5.122) 
SAME 7.500 
(5.169) 
6.410** 
(2.737) 
13.154 
(9.407) 
10.239 
(7.504) 
-2.255 
(2.186) 
-1.159 
(1.628) 
ELS 4.218 
(3.451) 
0.982 
(1.586) 
1.446 
(5.862) 
-0.633 
(4.279) 
0.085 
(1.437) 
-0.439 
(0.966) 
ELF -2.260 
(3.172) 
-2.675* 
(1.447) 
-8.165 
(5.432) 
-8.221** 
(3.842) 
-1.261 
(1.330) 
-1.306 
(0.885) 
MARP 3.344 
(19.784) 
9.609 
(9.781) 
-240.61*** 
(36.594) 
-246.32*** 
(30.219) 
44.232*** 
(9.196) 
52.962*** 
(8.298) 
PREFP -72.888*** 
(11.531) 
-71.737*** 
(6.354) 
1.2608 
(24.321) 
8.297 
(21.175) 
-17.736*** 
(4.920) 
-19.759*** 
(4.756) 
R2 0.670  0.772  0.676  
R2 Adjusted 0.587  0.715  0.595  
BUSE R2  0.818  0.766  0.525 
Raw R2  0.978  0.8578  0.879 
d.f. 52 52 52 52 52 52 
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 In general, modelling the public choice approach to intergovernmental grant determination 
provides mixed results. For both education and health grants, there would appear to be strong 
support for a public choice augmented model of grant determination. The most crucial elements in 
this process of purchasing political capital would appear to be a state's number of federal seats 
(SEAT), the share of those seats held by the federal government (SHP) and the incidence of federal 
elections (ELF). Similarity of political persuasion (SAME) would also appear to be instrumental, at 
least in regards to educational payments. Moreover, the proxies for political safety (MARP and 
PREFP) perform well for education and welfare, though inconsistently for health. In terms of 
welfare, the results which strongly favour a public choice model of grant determination seem to 
offer little support for traditional equity/efficiency criteria. Overall, at the level of specific purpose 
payments (SPPs), the results tend to support the findings of Grossman (1994: 301) that "...grants 
are greater to states whose officials...have significant political capital". They contrast most sharply 
with the findings of Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon (1991: 665) where the use of general purpose 
(equalising) grants and arbitrarily selected disability factors did not provide "...an adequate 
empirical explanation of the determination of intergovernmental grants. However, similarly to 
Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon (1991) the results highlight the importance of controlling for 
misspecification in the error structure. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper examines the theoretical proposition that intergovernmental grants are made on the basis 
of traditional equity/efficiency-type criteria (Oates, 1972; Gramlich, 1977), and public choice-type 
political expediency (Bretton and Scott, 1980; Grossman, 1987; 1994; Leyden, 1992). With respect 
to the latter, the grants process is apparently exploited by Downsian donor government politicians 
to purchase political capital in the federal "marketplace", thereby enhancing their probabilities of 
reelection. The empirical assessment of this process in Australia, with due regard for the existing 
institutional framework, finds that factors affecting the "market for political capital" do impact 
upon the distribution of grants in a federal system. The results also emphasise the need to control 
for the behaviour of the disturbances, both timewise and cross-sectionally, in estimations of grant 
determination. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1  See, for instance, Breton and Scott (1980), Grossman (1987; 1994) and Leyden (1992) for salient examples of work 
in this area. All of these approaches attempt to reconcile the direct costs of grants to donor government politicians 
with the indirect political benefits gained from recipient government politicians and/or voters. 
2  The federal/state grants nexus has attracted the attention of public choice theorists in the past, but largely in terms of 
the impact of intergovernmental grants on recipient and/or donor taxation and expenditure, "...rather than devising a 
rationale for grants" (Bungey, Grossman and Kenyon, 1991: 661). For examples of recipient impact, see Cournot, 
Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1979), Oates (1979), Winer (1983),  Logan and O'Brien (1989), Grossman (1990) and for 
impacts upon donor outcomes, see Logan (1986), Hammes and Wills (1987) and Dollery and Worthington (1995). 
3 Australian federalism is characterised by both large vertical  and horizontal fiscal imbalances. In terms of the 
vertical imbalance, the Commonwealth (federal) government accounts for some 80% of total governmental 
revenues, but only 49% of expenditure, with the figures for the states, including local government being 20% and 
51% respectively (Thomson, 1986: 170). Turning to horizontal imbalances, some 10% of general revenue or 
financial assistance grants made by the Commonwealth to the states are directed at compensating for variation in 
capacity (CGC, 1993 Vol. 1: 5). 
4  It is important to emphasise that fiscal equalisation in the Australian context applies to capacity rather than 
performance. "It [fiscal equalisation] does not guarantee to equalise outcomes; nor do we necessarily want this in a 
federation of states. Each state (through its voters and legislators) can choose how much or how little it wants by 
way of a state public sector and it is not the intention to overcompensate states which tax too little or spend too 
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much relative to states that either tax heavily or keep a close rein on their public expenditure" (Thomson, 1986: 
173). 
5  Bearing in mind previous misspecified empirical studies, it is not the objective of general revenue grants in Australia 
to ensure individual equity, even though they contribute to a state's capacity to provide it (CGC, Vol. 1 1993: 7). 
"They do not achieve interpersonal vertical equity; they do not make Commonwealth and State taxation systems 
fairer; they do not overcome shortcomings in the social security system...they do not reduce waiting times for 
hospital treatments or provide a cure for AIDS...They do none of these things because they are not intended to be the 
sole means of achieving interpersonal horizontal equity" (Mathews, 1988: 2) 
6  Prior to 1978, the standard or "benchmark" by which states were evaluated was usually one of the largest (in terms 
of population) states of NSW or Victoria (Thomson, 1986: 177). Since then the standard has been calculated using a 
six-state weighted average. The advantage of this system is that "...both policy and financial standards are thus 
internal...obviating any need for the Commission to make value judgements [concerning standards]" (CGC, 1993 
Vol. 1: 13). 
7  The discussion of expenditure disabilities, and more particularly relative expenditure disabilities, is particularly 
important to the empirical analysis contained in Section 3. 
8  The term "disabilities" should be taken to infer that both positive and negative disabilities may exist for both 
revenues and costs. A positive differential or disability in costs would be a higher per capita cost of provision than 
the standard, whilst a negative disability would be a lower per capita cost of provision. A positive disability for 
revenues would be a revenue disadvantage, a negative disability a revenue advantage. 
9 Thomson (1986), Mathews (1983) and Else-Mitchell (1983) provide a more detailed discussion of the 
Commonwealth Grants Commission's procedures. The principles, costs and benefits of fiscal equalisation are 
discussed at length in Mathews (1994). 
10 This statement is only strictly true for the period after 1981. Prior to the establishment of the CGC in 1933, the 
distribution of grants to the states lacked a "systematic basis" (Mathews, 1982: 2) and was largely "ad hoc" (Grover, 
1989: 30). In fact, Mathews (1994) identifies secession movements in three states which resulted from 
dissatisfaction with the ad hoc determination of grants, as the major factor in the establishment of the Commission. 
In the period 1933-1981, the CGC acted as an independent advisory body to the states recommending "special 
grants to supplement the large quantum of untied assistance already being paid to a state" (Grover, 1989: 31). It was 
during this time that "political decisions [on grant claimancy] ...and other political arrangements" dominated the 
distribution of grants (Grover, 1989: 31). It was only after 1981 that the whole of the untied assistance to the States 
was "...referred to the CGC for it to recommend relativities" under the principle of fiscal equalisation (Grover, 1989: 
31) 
11 The issue of SPPs has attracted some controversy in Australia as to their compatibility with, or treatment within, 
fiscal equalisation. "The principle of equalisation requires that all recurrent sources of funding available to a State be 
taken into account before calculating its need for general revenue assistance" (CGC, 1993 Vol. 1: 15). However, 
including SPPs would therefore override the agreements reached by governments for their very existence, 
subordinating them to fiscal equalisation objectives (Grover, 1989: 39).  
12 Following Grossman's (1987; 1994) model of federal intergovernmental grants: 
V - Voter support 
T - Total federal revenue 
X - Matrix of political characteristics 
E - Federal direct expenditure 
s1 - Subsistence quantity of E 
 
G - Intergovernmental grants 
s2 - Subsistence quantity of G 
 
 
Maximise (1) 
 
V = α log ( E − s 1 ) + ( a + b X i ) log ( G i − s 2 ) 
i = 1 
N 
∑   
Federal politician preferences are defined by a Stone-Geary function (Grossman, 1994: 296) 
 
Subject to (2) E + G i = T 
i = 1 
N 
∑  
Where α + Σ(a+bXi)=1. Xi is "a matrix of political characteristics measuring the amount and 
effectiveness of political capital  state politicians...have to sell" (Grossman, 1994: 297) 
 
Maximising (1) 
with respect to E 
and Gi  gives (3) 
G i = s 2 + ( a + bX i ) ( T - s 1 - Ns2 ) 
  
Gi is determined by (3). For any one year T, s1 and s2 are assumed small and (T-s1-
Ns2)=Z>0 (Grossman, 1994: 297) 
 
Rewriting (3) gives 
(4) 
G i = A + BX i 
  
Where A=(s2+aZ) and B=bZ. 
 
13 The hypotheses (models) are non-nested in the sense that one cannot be derived as a restricted version of the other. 
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14 The six Australian states employed are New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Western Australia, South Australia 
and Tasmania. The Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory have been excluded since they have, at 
least during the period in question, been in receipt of special developmental and promotional allowances in the first 
instance, and national capital, transitional and special fiscal needs allowances in the second instance (CGC, 1993 
Vol. 1: 34). 
15 Other benefits attributed to panel (pooled times-series, cross-sectional) analysis are: the ability to discriminate 
between competing economic hypotheses; the elimination or reduction of estimation bias; and the reduction of 
problems arising from data multicollinearity (Hsiao, 1986: 213-219). 
16 The dummy variable model is of the form  y it = β 1 j D jt + β   k X kit + e it
k = 2 
K 
∑ 
j = 1 
N 
∑  where there are i=1,2...N cross-
sectional observations, and t=1,2...T time-series observations. The dummy variables Djt are intended to capture 
differences in cross-sectional units when pooling by OLS. 
17 The model is estimated using a GLS procedure; after transformations designed to remove autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity, ordinary least squares is applied to the data (Kmenta, 1986: 511). 
18 Education, health and social security and welfare were selected as they were the only classifications of SPPs applied 
systematically across all states over the period in question. Other categories, such as housing and community 
amenities, economic development, and fiscal assistance were excluded since they are based on state-specific 
historical, geographic and ethnographic factors. 
19 The disability ratios are calculated by dividing the state's standardised per capita expenditure in that category by the 
national per capita standard. As a state's per capita expenditure disability rises relative to the national standard - that 
is, the per capita cost of providing the service becomes relatively high - the ratio will rise above unity signalling the 
application of equity/efficiency-type grants.  
20 The assessment of fiscal disabilities takes into account a "common pool" of factors such as administrative scale, 
urbanisation, input costs and physical environment as well as factors specific to the category of expenditure. Some 
examples are; the lack of private hospital facilities in health, the presence of non-government schools in education, 
and socio-economic composition (poverty) for social security and welfare (CGC, 1993 Vol. 1: Sect. 3). In so far as 
these disability ratios encompass specific factors it is not possible to theorise on the relationships that may exist 
between differing grant-types in the present study. Similarly, functional misspecifications are likely to occur if the 
grant-types are pooled. 
21 In 1992 the populations and total federal seats for the six states were: NSW 5.95 million (51 seats), VIC 4.44 (38), 
QLD 3.03 (24), WA 1.65 (14), SA 1.45 (13) and TAS 0.46 (5) (Estimated Resident Population of Australian States 
and Territories, Australian Bureau of Statistics, Cat. No. 3201.0, 1993). 
22 Kirchgässner and Schimmelpfennig (1992: 297) have argued that closeness counts, in terms of elector turnout, 
"...only if it is relevant for electoral victories or defeats". In the Australian context, the system of compulsory voting 
ensures high voter turnout with no significant variation across electorates. 
23 During the period in question, all state Legislative Assemblies and the federal House of Representatives (lower 
houses) were dominated by either the Australian Labor Party or Liberal/National Party Coalitions. However, the 
Australian Democrat Party, independents and small niche parties often hold the balance of power in the state 
Legislative Councils and the federal Senate (upper houses). The results of lower house elections are becoming less 
predictable, given the growth in numbers of independent and small party candidates, and the existing compulsory, 
preferential voting system. 
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